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INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN A COLD CLIMATE;
OR WHATEVER BECAME OF THE LAW MERCHANT?
Henry Harfield*
International trade can be conducted only under the rule of law.
There is no rule of law that governs international trade. These
statements form a paradox, and the beginning of two possible
syllogisms. One construction is that since there is no rule of law
governing international trade, and international trade is dependent
upon the rule of law, international trade must perish. The other and
more hopeful construction is that international trade does exist, it
must exist, and because it is dependent upon the rule of law, a rule of
law must be devised.
I believe in the latter formulation, but I recognize that there is a
vital difference between a rule of law and a principle of law. Principles
and rules both describe conduct; but a rule does more-it requires
conformity to the described conduct, under penalty of consequences.
These philosophical abstractions can be proved in the laboratory
experiment of trade, and as the trade becomes more sophisticated, the
proof of the abstraction becomes more concrete.
Bear with me for just a moment while I go back to first principles.
Trade was initially an exchange of goods. One party had a surplus cow
and the other had a surplus daughter. The exchange was fair, not
because rule 10(b)(5) had been invented, but because the parties were
dealing at arm's length and at the end of each arm there was a roughly
comparable club. One can be fairly certain, however, that if this
transaction had been articulated in philosophic terms, it would have
been articulated as a rule and not as a principle. Fairness of the
exchange did not grow out of regard for principle, but rather out of a
concern for the consequences of dissatisfaction.
Very early in social development, however, the necessity for a
somewhat more complex and comprehensive set of rules became
apparent. Probably the prime reason was that credit entered the scene.
Thus, there came a time when the trade transaction was not a
completed physical exchange of tangible goods, but rather contemplated an exchange of immediate performance for a call on future
performance. There are those who say that money lies at the root of
this complication, as at the root of all evil, but I believe that credit
* Member of the New York Bar. Member of the firm of Shearman & Sterling.
B.A., 1934, Yale University; LL.B., 1937, Columbia University.
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came before money. Of course, I do not use the word "credit" as it is
used today in a sophisticated sense, but rather in its very primitive
sense of belief or reliance. The word is derived, I suppose, from the
Latin credo-"I believe." A man was prepared to part with goods or
services because he believed that his opposite party would perform by
giving him goods or services in return at some future date. He acted on
that belief because he relied on the certainty that society would
enforce the promised performance.
In those early days a sense of formalism was more prevalent, at least
in the United States, than it is today. The rules were rather narrowly
stated and there had to be perfectly strict compliance in order to
invoke the sanctions of society. The case of Weeks v. Tybald' is
precisely in point. The facts were simple. The defendant was heard "to
affirm and publish" that he would give 100 pounds "to him that
should marry his daughter with his consent." The plaintiff forthwith
married Miss Tybald and, whatever his gratifications may have been,
they were not pecuniary in character: he was no richer. He therefore
brought an action in assumpsit against the defendant, but the writ was
dismissed. The court said, in effect, that words spoken in haste to
excite suitors did not constitute a contract.
You may think that I am wandering, and perhaps I am, but only a
few years ago, when a client was proposing to spend a very substantial
amount of money in a North African country in reliance on its
recently enacted investment guaranties law, I had occasion to ask the
Minister of Finance of that country if he were aware of Weeks v.
Tybald, and whether he proposed to rely upon that case. Perhaps as a
consequence of my inquiry we entered into a very carefully and rather
comprehensively drafted concession, which looked more to the
Dartmouth College case than to Weeks v. Tybald.
This anecdote illustrates my first point. Trade requires a rule of law
if it is to be anything more than a very simple swap. International
trade has the same fundamental requirement as domestic trade; it can
function only if there is a set of rules upon which sellers can rely when
they ship their goods abroad and upon which buyers can rely when
they pay for goods in transit to them. Generally speaking, however,
the rule of law that regulates trade is necessarily a rule of municipal
law, because no nation has the right to make laws for the regulation of
conduct in other sovereignties. 2

1. 74 Eng. Rep. 982 (K.B. 1605).
2. That is not to say that the laws of one nation may not prescribe
consequences for conduct occurring in another sovereignty. See, e.g., United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Consequently, a realistic appraisal of our present structure reveals
that there is no international law of sales; nor, indeed, is there any
private international law of commercial transactions that is really
worthy of the name. There is no set of precise and enforceable rules
for the governance of particular transactions. Most of the body of
private international law is, in effect, a body of conflicts law-rules for
the choice of law that is to determine and resolve the particular
controversy. This situation is almost inevitable, because even if there
were a comprehensive body of private international commercial law,
there is no international court that can undertake and enforce the
adjudication. Under such a structure, which provides for the adjudication of commercial controversies in the courts of one nation or
another, most nations are entitled to set their own rules of conflict or
choice of law under the auspices of private international law. They
therefore have an almost overwhelming temptation to apply the law
with which they are most familiar, and in most cases that law is their
own.
International commercial transactions are affected by political
considerations as well as by divergent systems of municipal law. The
expectations of the parties obviously may be frustrated by war or
nationalization, but equally they may be frustrated by such less direct
measures as currency controls, embargoes and discriminatory taxation.
In such instances the ordinary choice of law rules frequently are put
aside or considerably altered in their application. In the United States,
at least, courts have been disposed to apply American rules of conduct
without regard to the locus of the transaction where the rule reflects a
fundamental national policy. The antitrust cases and Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook3 generally are not regarded as being in the field of
commercial transactions, but it is not difficult to imagine a commercial dispute to which the doctrine of those cases might be relevant.
Apparently, then, the increasing political and economic impact of
divergent national policies on conventional mechanisms for resolving
legal conflicts, as well as a concomitant increase in the volume of international transactions, emphasizes the need for some commonly
accepted set of rules. Against this background I propose to examine
the relative sufficiency in meeting that need of the Uniform Customs
3. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (rehearing en

banc), cert. denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). In
Schoenbaum, a 10(b)(5) action to recover profits made on "insider" knowledge,
the Securities Exchange Act was held to have extraterritorial effect "to
protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of
improper foreign transactions in American securities." 405 F.2d at 206.
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and Practice for Commercial Documentary Credits, Brochure No. 222
of the International Chamber of Commerce, and article 5 of the
Uniform Commercial Code.
Both sets of rules are concerned with letters of credit, and it is
useful to consider the nature of the transactions that are intended to
be governed by these two sets of rules. Each set of rules makes clear
that a letter of credit is quite distinct from a sales contract or any
other related contract. The letter of credit is essentially a payment
mechanism, but it also has a long history as a useful international
instrument for carrying out the payment term of a trade transaction.
For our purposes, then, ascertainment of a good governing system for
letters of credit is an exercise that may be applied profitably to any
other international commercial transaction.
The Code and Customs are identical in concept. It should be
remembered that article 5 is one of eight, each dealing with defined
areas of commercial activity. When the Code was adopted in New
York in 1962, Governor Rockefeller said:
This action is of far-reaching importance not merely because the Uniform
Commercial Code constitutes a comprehensive and general revision and
recodification of New York's commercial laws.
The adoption of the Code in New York State... is a major step toward
the enactment of a single uniform body of commercial law throughout the
United States. 4
Today, the Code has been adopted in all states except Louisiana.
Section 1-102 of the Code describes its underlying purposes and
policies as follows:
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;
(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
One of the primary objectives of the letter of credit article of the
Code, then, was to achieve within the federal framework of the United
States precisely the kind of interjurisdictional body of law that we
have been discussing. In his commentary to section 1-101 of the New
York Code, Lester Denonn said:
While it is true that this is the Uniform Commercial Code, the ideal of
uniformity has not been attained. It is, therefore, indispensable that the

4. Governor's Memorandum of Approval, 62

(Part 1)

MCKINNEY'S

CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK (ANNOTATED) xiii.
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Code of the particular state involved be consulted to be certain that the
applicable sections are properly brought to bear upon the problem at hand.5
Nevertheless, the structure of the Code is uniform; the local
deviations are not numerous and are readily ascertainable. An
interstate transaction may be planned therefore with reasonable
confidence concerning the terms and outcome of any dispute. In the
light of this fact and in the recollection of Governor Rockefeller's
laudatory statements, it is fair to ask why New York State has, in
effect, adopted the Uniform Customs and Practices and relegated the
Code to a secondary position. The 1963 Report of the New York Law
Revision Commission provided a partial answer to that question in the
following words:
The primary objective of the Uniform Commercial Code is to expedite the
conduct of commercial transactions. Although there may be room for
argument, the furtherance of the objectives of the Code may require, for the
present and as a practical international matter, maintenance of6 established
routines of the New York international letters of credit business.
To examine the reason behind that statement it is necessary to note
the fundamental distinction between article 5 of the Code and the
Uniform Customs and Practices. That distinction is one neither of
content nor of the form of expression. There are differences of
substance and content between the Uniform Customs and the Code,
but they are surprisingly few in number. The respective forms of
expressing the rules are significantly different, but each is reasonably
understandable; I believe that a Frenchman would have no more
difficulty in understanding a translation of article 5 than the average
American has in understanding the English text of the Uniform
Customs and Practices. The fundamental difference is that the Code is
a law and the Customs are an agreement.
There is, therefore, a difference in the scope of coverage: law
prescribes conduct in the area controlled or affected by the lawmaker;
agreement prescribes conduct between parties. Thus one is essentially
geographical; the other is essentially transactional. When a transaction
occurs in more than one jurisdiction-i.e. when it is transnational in
its character-the first problem is to find out not what the law
prescribes but rather what law controls. This preliminary task is
eliminated where the set of rules are transactional rather than
geographical in their application. Putting the matter differently, the
5. Practice Commentary, 62

(Part 1)
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international acceptance of the Uniform Customs and the habit of
incorporating them by reference into every international letter of
credit accomplishes two purposes: first, it makes the choice of law
inquiry unnecessary; secondly, it facilitates the resolution of the
controversy. The Uniform Customs, once incorporated, are in effect
contract terms, which will be given full effect under almost any
system of commercial law.
Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of
law and equity, including the law merchant.., shall supplement its
provisions.
The law merchant, of course, had its origins in the customs of
merchants, and was particularly beneficial to those merchants who
traded among nations at a time when municipal law was sparse,
primitive and unpredictable. In our contemporary world, with its
vastly increased volume of international transactions and its vastly
more complex interplay of national, political and economic policies
on private trade and transactions, municipal law is neither sparse nor
primitive, but it has not become more predictable. In these circumstances, when the rule of law is not likely to be expressed and
enforced by a supergovernment or by a unanimity of nations, the
custom of merchants may be the best hope for that degree of
predictability without which international transactions cannot survive.
Let me see if I can frame my thesis in the terms of an actual
problem that is so contemporary that it has not yet been resolved.
There is an area in Africa that was formerly a colony of one of the
large trading nations of Europe. It is now an independent republic,
and I shall refer to it as Middle Euphoria, although that is not its true
name. A United States bank does business in Middle Euphoria. It does
not conduct that business through a branch or agency; it has organized
a local banking institution-its wholly-owned subsidiary-under the
laws of Middle Euphoria. One of the major commercial houses in
Middle Euphoria is an importer. At the request of that importer the
subsidiary bank issued a letter of credit for his account covering an
importation of merchandise. In due course, title documents were
presented to and paid by the subsidiary bank. Prior to the arrival of
the merchandise, however, the Government of Middle Euphoria had
found the importer guilty of some horrid offense, and had imposed
fines that exceeded the importer's total resources. Accordingly, when
the subsidiary bank sought reimbursement from the importer for the
amounts it had paid out under the letter of credit, the importer was
unable to respond. When the merchandise itself arrived in Middle
Euphoria shortly thereafter,the Government immediately seized it as a
Fall, 1972
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means of collecting the fines it had imposed on the importer. As law
school examination questions used to say: "What are the rights of the
parties?"
There is no doubt under the law merchant, under any custom of
trade, under the Uniform Customs and Practice, and even under the
Uniform Commercial Code, that the subsidiary bank is the owner of
the merchandise in question, or that at the very least it has a superior
security title. At the same time, it is equally clear that the
Government of Middle Euphoria is considerably larger than the
subsidiary bank, has actual possession of that merchandise, and claims
that it was seized in aid of the government levy on the debt owed by
the importer to the Government. If you are representing the bank,
what do you advise it to do? What authority do you cite?
It is a delict under international law for the Government of Middle
Euphoria to seize property that belongs to the subsidiary bank. This is
especially true
that bank, although incorporated in Middle
Euphoria, is in essence an alien doing business in that country. But
where is there an international court that is prepared to adjudicate and
implement the international law which I think I have accurately
stated?
There is very little doubt that the seizure by the Government of
Middle Euphoria is a clear violation of constitutional rights enjoyed by
the American shareholder of the subsidiary bank. Does the protection
of the United States Constitution extend to Middle Euphoria? I realize
that our Constitution provides that Congress is entitled to define and
punish offenses against the laws of nations, but do the other nations
know and accept that? And if they do, what court has jurisdiction
over this dispute?
It is very clear to me that the Uniform Commercial Code neither
has any application nor provides any degree of comfort. The record is
silent on whether there is a commercial code of Middle Euphoria and
on whether that municipal law would either approve or denounce
what the Government has done. Nor is there any indication of the
means of exhausting legal remedies in Middle Euphoria. There is no
possibility that I can see of finding a tribunal in which it can be
asserted successfully that the hypothetical laws of Middle Euphoria, or
the concrete acts of its Government, must in this case be subordinated
to some international or supranational law or body of laws.'
7. I do not suggest that if a municipal court, in the United States or elsewhere,
had jurisdiction of the person of the Middle Euphorian Government in a proper
case (see, e.g.,National City Bank v. 'Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955)), it
could not do justice. As in the preparation of rabbit stew, the first problem is to
catch the rabbit.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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In short, there is a vacuum: there are no dispositive rules of conduct.
This problem, of course, is a function of the theme of this

conference-changing circumstances-but also I must hasten to point
out that in international trade and private international transactions
circumstances have been changing since the days of the Phoenicians.
The problem, stated very succinctly, is this: our politics never seem
to catch up to our economics. More appropriately stated for this
learned gathering, our municipal laws and foggy concepts of international jurisprudence are, to put it most charitably, not adequate to
meet the requirements of the circumstances of international trade that
are changing today, and that have been changing virtually since trade
began. But whether it is the ancient custom and usage that became
known as the law merchant, or the more modem and more specialized
arrangements found in such bodies of rules as the Uniform Customs
and Practice, or Incoterms (defining trade terms) or the efforts by the
International Chamber of Commerce to establish comparable rules for
the collection of international negotiable instruments, the agreements
of merchants are relatively effective within their limited areas. I
cannot say whether the hypothetical problem that I have described to
you in Middle Euphoria would be solved if that country or the bank
had formally adhered to the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Commercial Documentary Credits, but it is quite clear to me that if
the rights of merchants and their bankers had been defined clearly by
some international consensual agreement, there would be great
reluctance on the part of any government, even that of Middle
Euphoria, to step out of the line of practice in the community of
trading nations.
I do not propose, even in jest, that article 5 of the Uniform
Commercial Code should be repealed. Nor do I suggest that all of the
problems brought about by changing circumstances would be solved
by an extrapolation of the Uniform Customs and Practice to create a
consensual international Uniform Commercial Code, so that the very
cold climate for international trade would instantly become an
economic Garden of Eden. But I do throw out the question whether
an extrapolation and further development of rules among merchants,
in the old tradition of the law merchant, may not be an extraordinarily useful stopgap, perhaps more useful than variegated
municipal legislation, as we move so painfully slowly on our way to
Utopia.
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